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Abstract
This paper investigates the robustness of political budget cycles in a stripped-down 
setting with endogenous output and endogenous rent-seeking. No matter if or how 
government manipulations affect aggregate demand, equilibrium transfer and deficit 
cycles emerge. The government can always improve reelection chances by increasing 
debt-financed transfers before elections and cutting transfers to repay the deficit after 
elections. As for endogenous rent-seeking, deficit cycles are still robust, but transfer 
payments to voters are substituted by socially costly expropriation payments.
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1 Introduction
After more than  th irty  years of research, the theory of political business cycles (PBCs) 
spurred by Nordhaus (1975) has changed focus in several ways. There is now an increased 
recognition th a t m onetary policy is not the main tool of electioneering.1 The rejection of a 
m onetary-induced PBC does not mean th a t the whole existence of political business cycles 
has been rejected. On the contrary, there is strong evidence of fiscal cycles. Namely, the 
deficit levels have been found to increase prior to elections in industrial countries by Alesina 
et al. (1992, 1993) or Alesina and Roubini (1990). Drazen (2001) emphasises tha t there is 
evidence of pre-electoral increases in transfers and other fiscal policy instrum ents in several 
countries. In developing countries, there seems to be even more support for political fiscal 
cycles.2
The groundwork for a theory of the political budget cycle was laid by Rogoff (1990). In his 
paper, incumbents use debt-financed public goods to signal their competence and increase 
their reelection prospects. In tha t paper as well as more recent contributions stressing the 
key role of fiscal policy such as Shi and Svensson (2006) there are typically at least two 
unresolved problems. First, policymakers are modeled to receive a rent, but cannot affect 
its magnitude, even if developing countries are the main target of the investigation. Second, 
output is kept exogenous and feedback effects are ignored. Only Drazen (2001) allows a 
feedback effect of the budget cycle onto output through rules-based m onetary policy in 
what he calls an active fiscal, passive m onetary policy (AFPM) model.
This paper investigates the robustness of equilibrium transfer and deficit cycles in a stripped- 
down political budget cycle setting with endogenous output and endogenous rent-seeking.
1 Drazen (2001) stresses that the evidence to support a monetary policy-induced business cycle is weak. 
More precisely, there is no support to the idea that aggregate economic activity is boosted before elections, at 
least not in OECD countries. Alt and Chrystal (1983) had already come to that conclusion when surveying 
the earlier empirical literature, and Faust and Irons (1999) added more recent support to the same claim.
2 Evidence of opportunistic cycles in budgets and transfers is reported by Block (2002), Schuknecht 
(1996, 2000), Shi and Svensson (2006), or Vergne (2009).
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The existence of uninformed voters tem pts the incumbent government to try  to appear 
more competent than  it is by providing individuals with large transfers, the level of which 
can be observed by everybody. Even though some voters do not have full information, 
they anticipate (as in Shi and Svensson, 2006) th a t the government tries to suggest higher 
competence by increasing the level of debt-financed transfer payments. Based on our model, 
we can show th a t an increase in the share of uninformed voters and an increase in politicians’ 
political rents raises the equilibrium level of transfers and deficits.3 Transfer and deficit 
cycles emerge.
We then extend the analysis by endogenising output. As in Drazen (2001), we model the 
fiscal policy effect via output on utility in addition to its direct effect on utility. Drazen pos­
tulates an aggregate supply function and studies the effect of fiscal policy under alternative 
monetary policies. By contrast, we assume th a t production is demand-determined in the 
short run. We consider the most general multiplier effects of fiscal policy which could be both 
expansionary and /o r contractionary before and after elections, thereby allowing Keynesian, 
Classical or New Keynesian output effects of government manipulations. Qualitatively, we 
obtain the same results as before (for exogenous output), but they differ quantitatively. If, 
for instance, deficit finance has a less expansionary (or more contractionary) effect onto 
output, a politically motivated government prefers less deficit because the positive impact 
of manipulations is reduced.
In a second extension, we study the impact of giving the government another instrument. 
In addition to transfer manipulations, the incumbent can choose its most desired level of 
the rent (up to a maximum). Instead of the original model’s ego rent (from being in office) 
which is costless for society, the extension captures expropriation by the government, i.e. 
the government’s power to enrich itself to the detrim ent of society. Rent-seeking has a 
direct beneficial effect for the government, but, at the same time, it is also costly for the
3 This result parallels the findings of the Shi and Svensson, who focus, however, on deficits and public 
goods provision.
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government because rents are (like transfers) also debt-financed, but does (unlike transfers) 
not contribute to appearing more competent. We find th a t the government will always 
choose the maximally possible rent. Deficit cycles are amplified, because the deficit must 
now cover both the rent (which benefits the incumbent directly) as well as transfers to the 
public (which improve the incumbents re-election chances).
The results of both extensions are not obvious, but quite intuitive. To our knowledge, there 
is no empirical study complementing our theoretical findings. Nor has the interdependence 
between budget cycles and endogenous output or rent-seeking been studied rigorously so 
far. Nonetheless, it is instructive to compare this paper more closely with Rogoff (1990) 
and the theory part in Shi and Svensson (2006). All three papers are inspired by Rogoff’s 
(1990) critique of the traditional PBC literature logic. Rogoff points out th a t rational voters 
should not let their expectations about postelection performance be influenced by preelection 
budgets. All three papers model the voting outcome, more plausibly, as a function of 
voters’ expectations about the candidates’ performance after elections. In Rogoff (1990) the 
political budget cycle is caused by the incum bent’s ability to observe her own competence 
before the general public. Here and in Shi and Svensson (2006), the political budget cycle 
is produced by an information asymmetry between different types of private agents, which 
affects the public’s perception of the policymakers’ competence. A share of the population 
is uninformed because they shy away from acquiring information th a t is costly or, as Shi 
and Svensson suggest, because their access to information is restricted.
The structure of this paper emphasises the differences to both Rogoff (1990) and Shi and 
Svensson (2006) in three other respect. First, it responds to the empirical finding th a t it 
is mainly transfers th a t are increased in pre-election years. The basic transfer model is 
presented in Section 2 and the solution is outlined in Section 3. We show th a t transfers 
depend on the share of uninformed voters and on the magnitude of the rent the incumbent 
receives from staying in power. We obtain deficit and transfer cycles, whereas Rogoff (1990) 
and Shi and Svensson (2006) model deficit and public goods provision. Second, we capture
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the interdependence between output and rational political manipulations of deficits and 
transfers by policymakers in Section 4. In contrast, output is exogenous and constant 
both  in Rogoff (1990) and in Shi and Svensson (2006). Third, we allow the government to 
endogenously determine its desired amount of the rent in Section 5. Again, this is constant 
in Rogoff (1990) and in Shi and Svensson (2006). Section 6 concludes with a summary of 
the findings and suggestions for future research.
2 A P olitical Transfer M odel
In this model, every second period an incumbent politician and a challenger representing 
different parties run for office. Politicians’ motivation is purely opportunistic. Nonetheless, 
voters’ utility does not hinge on economic considerations alone, but also on a more or less 
strong personal predisposition or sympathy for one of the candidates.4 The utility function 
for any voter i reflects both  economic and non-economic components:
Ut =  £  [c. +  aO 'z.l (1)
s=t
The economic component cs (consumption) and the sympathy component 9%zs are additively- 
separable with relative weight a  in each period. Discounting between periods could be 
added, but does not contribute to substance nor exposition. Utility derived from sympathy 
is constrained to 9%zs E [— | , | ] since zt is either — 1 (when party a is elected) or +  2 (when 
party b is elected); and the personal sympathy param eter 0% is uniformly distributed over 
the interval [—1 ,1].5 The sympathy component represents any attribu te  of the candidates 
th a t does not affect economic policies, be it their stance on societal issues or their good
4 Henceforth the terms voter and individual (agent) are used interchangeably. Similarly, the terms 
politician and policymaker are also used as synonyms. Furthermore, we associate the incumbent with party 
a and the challenger with party b without limiting the generality of the analysis.
5 If individual i has somewhat more sympathies for party a, say at 0l = — 2, then her utility derived 
from sympathy is positive (| ), if party a is elected (z = — 2); but it is negative ( — | ), if party b is elected
(zi = 2).
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looks. As in Shi and Svensson (2006), there are two kinds of voters. Informed voters ob­
serve all variables in the economy, uninformed voters can only observe a subset.6 Both 
politicians j  =  a,b  face a similar utility function as voters consisting of an economic and a 
non-economic component. The non-economic component is, however, the political rent X t 
th a t policymakers receive from being in power:
Vj  =  £  [c, +  Xs]. (2)
s=t
Voters’ and politicians’ consumption alike are constrained by each agent’s net-of-tax income 
yt and transfers t t :
ct =  yt +  tt. (3)
The government budget constraint is
t t =  Dt — R (D t-1) +  n't, (4)
where D measures deficit, R  depicts repayment, and n is the incum bent’s competence. 
Transfers are determined by the policymaker in power. They are intertem poral transfers, 
not income redistribution.7 They allow more government subsidies or benefits. Transfers 
are debt-financed; they depend on deficit minus repayment. (Repayment function R  is 
assumed to be positively sloping and convex with R(0) =  0.) However, the to tal amount of
6 This is explained at the end of this section. Confer the paragraph on the timing of events on page 6.
7 Instead of equations (3) and (4) a fuller fiscal model could be used, but results are identical. In that 
case, let variable yt be gross income and t t depict net transfers, i.e. t t is negative and the absolute value of 
t t represents taxes minus transfers. Taxes would be used to finance a fixed amount of public goods. The 
question would then be: how much can we reduce the tax burden by deficit finance? An example is the 
discussion about a previously abolished commuter tax relief (Pendlerpauschale) in July 2008 in Germany. 
For obvious political reasons some politicians, especially from the Bavarian CSU party, which faced an 
upcoming election, wanted to reintroduce this tax relief at the expense of achieving a balanced budget 
sooner rather than later.
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transfers also depends on incumbent politician j ’s competence in period t, .8 Competence 
nj consists of skills shocks for this period and for last period. Each skills shock is a random 
variable with mean 0, distribution function F (•) and density function f  (•). Past shocks are 
common knowledge, but current or future shocks are unknown to both  policymakers and 
private agents. One-period competence persistence is modeled as an MA(1) process:9
^  +  V t-v  (5)
The timing of events is as follows. In period t, the incumbent sets deficit level Dt , thus 
providing transfers for the public according to equation (4). Voting individuals observe 
transfer level t t and past skills shock ^ j-1 . Only informed voters observe D t , uninformed 
voters do not. This assumption simplifies the reality of hidden accounts and disguised 
information about government finances.10 Informed voters can deduce current skills , and 
can, therefore, extract information about the future competence of the incumbent, which the 
uninformed voters cannot. Then, informed and uninformed voters cast their vote based on 
their different information sets. W hat m atters is tha t some voters are imperfectly informed. 
Given th a t the probability of being pivotal is almost zero, there is no incentive for becoming 
informed by gathering costly information in order to improve one’s electoral choice. In
8 For nj > 0, (net) transfers t would surpass the net deficit, Dt — R(Dt-1). In a developing country, we 
could interpret nj as the government’s ability to secure foreign aid, which does not have to be repaid. In 
any country, it may also reflect its ability to seize and exploit profitable investment opportunities.
9 Limited persistence is a compromise. It allows some persistence while acknowledging that competence 
also changes over time as new tasks for politicians emerge. For persistence longer than 1 period, the model 
would not be easily solvable. Rogoff’s suggestion of an MA(1) process is one of two conditions for splitting 
the model into separate 2-period cycles (each consisting of an election period and an off-election period) as 
is so common in this literature. Confer the discussion of deficit repayment in the off-election period in the 
paragraph on the timing of events on page 6.
io Prima facie, it may seem strange that a fraction of voters should be uninformed about the deficit or, 
at least, ignore the deficit in their economic considerations. Since the Maastricht criteria at the latest we 
are used to extensive discussions of deficit levels and deficit reduction strategies. However, some countries 
managed to manipulate their deficit numbers prior to the start of the European Monetary Union, for instance 
by falsifying their figures or hiding social security debt. Furthermore, remember that deficit levels were, at 
least in many European countries, of little concern in the 1970s and early 1980s. In developing countries, it 
is even more obvious that a fraction of society is not informed and/or does not incorporate deficit numbers 
into their economic calculations.
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period t +  1, the winner (incumbent or challenger) takes office. Voters are no longer relevant 
for policymakers’ decision making because they cannot vote in period t +  1. Politicians want 
to repay the previous period deficit because the deficit is costly11 and voters cannot sanction 
the policymaker for reducing transfers, i.e. effectively levying additional taxes, to finance 
deficit repayment. Given th a t voters are only concerned about politicians competence after 
the election it does not m atter th a t individuals anticipate in election period t  th a t politicians 
will repay the deficit in the off-election period t +  1.
3 M odel Solution
The model is solved in three steps. First, we can determine the probability th a t an individual 
agent votes for the incumbent, to whom we refer to as party a , without loss of generality. 
Second and on this basis, we can derive the probability for the incumbent to win the election 
for a given level of transfers, which depend on the deficit level and the competence level of 
the incumbent. Third, we can maximise the incum bent’s expected utility over any 2-period 
cycle, i.e. period t utility plus period t + 1  utility in case of winning the election multiplied 
by the probability of winning (as determined in step 2) plus period t +  1 utility in case 
of losing multiplied by the probability of losing. Assuming exogenous income, we derive 
the first order condition (FOC) to characterise the optimal level of deficit. In the the next 
section we relax the exogenous income assumption.
In the first step, we consider an individual voter. She will vote for incumbent a , if
E t [ca+1 +  a 0%(- - )] >  E t [cb+1 +  a ^t(+ 2 )] . (6)
' ---------------------------------- V ---------------------------------- '  ' ---------------------------------- V ---------------------------------- '
exp. utility when a in power exp. utility when b in power
11 Repayment is guaranteed, technically, because the marginal utility of additional deficit (through its 
1-for-1 effect on transfers and, finally, on consumption) is 1 (given that the discount factor is 1), whereas 
the marginal cost (R'(D)) and, therefore, the marginal disutility is greater than 1. The unity marginal 
utility assumption is also used by Shi and Svensson (2006) for the same purpose as here, albeit with respect 
to the public goods consumption. -  With less restrictive assumptions, we could get a rising trend in debt.
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Depending on who is in power, t +  1 consumption will typically differ because of differences 
in policymakers’ competence and individuals’ expectations about it:
E t [c“+1] =  E t [yt+i] +  E t [t“+1]; E t [cb+i] =  E t [yt+i] +  E t [ti+i]; (7) 
t t+1 =  —R (D t) +  nt+i. (8)
Period t +  1 government budget constraint (8) says th a t the period t deficit must be repaid 
in period t +  1.12 As a result, t +  1 transfers are negative (taxes) corresponding to deficit 
repayment modulo the effect of the policymaker’s competence. Individuals have no idea 
about the skills shock of either policymaker in t +  1. Nor do they know the skills shock of 
the challenger in period t. However, they can use the incum bent’s period t deficit policy to 
draw conclusions about her skills shock in period t.
E,[tb+i] =  —e ,[R (d ;)]. (9)
E<Kh 1 =  — E ,[R (D t- ) ]+  E ,K ] ,  (10)
where D^ denotes the equilibrium level of deficit, which also corresponds to the incum bent’s 
optimal period t choice for the deficit (to be determined further down). Combining equations 
(6) to (10) we obtain a condition for an individual to vote for incumbent a:
W ]  >  (11)
Using the distribution of the skills shock we can determine the probability (P r) of an 
individual voter, informed or uninformed, to vote for incumbent a:
P r ^ K ' ]  — aS ' >  0] =  E ‘[y?] . ( ,a ) =  ^  +  1. (12)
a  — (—a) 2a 2
12 Remember that policymakers will not borrow in period t + 1 because there is no election at the end of 
that period. Confer the discussion in the paragraph on the timing of events on page 6.
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In step 2, we determine the probability Prob th a t incumbent a obtains 50% of the votes 
in period t elections. It is the probability th a t the number of voters times their individual 
probability P r  to vote for incumbent a (as determined in equation 12) is greater or equal to
2. However, the individual probability P r  is different for informed and uninformed voters 
because their expectations of period t skills, E t [^'], are different. Hence
informed uninformed
So why is there a difference in expectations for informed and uninformed voters? Consider 
the government budget constraint for period t:
tt =  Dt +  nt (14)
Remember th a t policymakers will not borrow in off-election periods because higher transfers 
and appearing more competent does not affect the duration of the incum bent’s time in 
office. W ithout deficit in off-election period t — 1 there is no repayment in election period 
t. Equation (14) can be rewritten as follows:
nt =  tt -  Dt
E tm/ [k“] =  =  t t — D t — ^ “-1 (15)
The point is th a t informed voters can determine [^“] deterministically, because they 
can observe D t . By contrast, uninformed voters must form an estimate of the incum bent’s 
skills, , based on their estimate for the deficit level, D t :
=  t t — -^t — K“- i  (16) 
or D t =  t t — — 1
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=  tt — D t — K“-1 + D t — D t (17)
'------------------------ V-------------------------'
^  from (15)
E r n/ [k“] =  +  Dt — Dt (18)
Using equations (15) and (18) we can now determine the probability tha t incumbent a 
receives 50% of the votes in period t:
Prob L [  ^  +  1 ] +  (1 — a ) [ +  D ‘ — D ‘ +  1 ] >  1 }
\  2a 2  v n  2a 2  “  2j
=  Prob ( ^  +  (1 — a ) Dt — - t  +  1 >  1 }
I 2a v ; 2a 2 “  2
=  Prob >  (1 — a)(D t — Dt)} (19)
=  1 — F  [(1 — a)(D t — Dt)], (20)
where F (•) is the distribution function of the skills shock.
In step 3, we can maximise incumbent a ’s utility over the entire election cycle, i.e. periods 
t and t +  1. Period t +  1 utility is the sum of the utilities for winning and losing the election 
weighted by the probability determined in step 2:
maxDt Et{yt +  Dt +  nt“ +  X }
+ E ‘{|1 — F  [(1 — a )(D ‘ — Dt)]] [yt+1 — R (D ‘) +  nf+! +  X  ]}
'-----------------------------------------------V-----------------------------------------------'
prob. incumbent wins 
+ E ‘{ |F  [(1 — a )(D ‘ — D ‘)]] [yt+i — R (D ‘) +  n?+i]} (21)
'--------------v--------------'
prob. incumbent loses
Assuming constant income and the incum bent’s knowledge about her past, but not her 
present and future skills (and not the skills shock of the challenger), the maximisation 
problem looks as follows:
m aiD j y +  Dt +  1 +  X
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+ y -  R (D t)
+  [1 — F  [(1 — a)(D t — Dt)]]X (22)
Differentiation with respect to Dt produces the following FOC:
1 — R '(D t) +  (1 — a)F '[(1  — a)(D t — D t)]X  =  0 (23)
We argued before th a t both  informed and uninformed private agents anticipate th a t the 
government tries to cheat. Thus D t* =  D t =  D t is an equilibrium condition. Inserted into 
the FOC, we obtain:
1 +  (1 — a ) f  [0]X =  R '(D -) (24)
Applying total differentials to the FOC tells us what affects the optimal level of borrowing. 
We obtain the following perturbation results with respect to political rent X  and share of 
informed voters a:
dD* dD* , ,
d T  > 0 a t  < 0 (25)
Higher political rents and a larger share of uninformed voters increase optimal borrowing. 
Intuitively, if the ego rent of being in power increases, then the incentive to distort the 
economy also increases. The incumbent will be more willing to increase deficit to appear 
more competent in the eye of voters. Furthermore, increasing the share of informed voters 
reduces the efficiency of electioneering because fewer voters can be fooled before elections.
4 E ndogenising O utput
It is one of the weaknesses of Rogoff (1990) and Shi and Svensson (2006) as well as this 
paper thus far th a t output is kept exogenous. Let us now account for the interdepen­
dence between deficit and output. We postulate a very general formulation, which allows a
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debt-financed fiscal policy to produce both expansionary and /or contractionary effects on 
aggregate demand. In each period, we assume transfers to have a linear effect on output:
yt =  y +  btt (26)
Coefficient b could be interpreted as multiplier, but, a priori, it could be positive or nega­
tive. We could even distinguish different worlds we live in: b >  0 could be interpreted as 
Keynesian, b <  0 as Classical, and b >  0 first, but later b <  0 possibly as New Keynesian. If 
we assumed a Keynesian world, for instance, there would be a positive demand effect in the 
period when the deficit occurs (b >  0 and t t >  0), but some negative effect in the repayment 
period (b >  0 and t t <  0). Inserting equations (14) and (8), respectively, we obtain the 
following output equations (with typically b1 =  b2):
yt =  y +  bi (Dt +  nt) 
yt+1 =  y +  b2( R (D t) +  n‘+1) (27)
Incorporating the output effect of deficit finance into the analysis affects the individual’s 
choice of who to vote for (step 1), but not the probability th a t incumbent a receives 50% of 
the vote (step 2). Instead of (22) we now obtain the following maximisation problem:
m axDt y +  (1 +  bi)(Dt +  ) +  X  
+ y  — (1 +  b2)R(Dt)
+  [1 — F  [(1 — a)(D t — Dt)]]X (28)
Note th a t the exogenous output case discussed in Section 3 is a special case with b1 =  b2 =  0. 
Instead of (24) the first order condition becomes:
(1 +  bi) +  (1 — a) ƒ [0]X =  (1 +  b2 )R '(D -) (29)
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We still obtain th a t the incum bent’s optimal D depends positively on the ego rents X  and 
the share of uninformed voters 1 — a, but we can also obtain perturbation results for the 
multipliers b1 and b2:
dD* dD* . .
"367 > 0 dbT < 0 (30)
The first inequality says th a t the government will optimally choose to increase the level 
of deficit, if the expansionary effect of deficit finance on current output (measured by b1) 
increases (or the contractionary effect decreases). Increasing the marginal benefit of running 
a deficit in the first period raises the incentive to electioneer. The second result concerning 
b2 is the analogue. If the marginal cost of deficit repayment on future output is raised (or 
its marginal benefit reduced), a politically motivated government will borrow less. In other 
words, if deficit finance becomes more contractionary, be it in t or t +  1, the deficit and 
transfer cycle will be less pronounced. However, if the deficit finance tool becomes more 
effective, it is optimal to use it more. We can also compare our results to those obtained 
for exogenous output. If deficit finance has, on the whole, a positive effect on output, the 
government will exploit the situation and exacerbate the cycle. Overall, deficit and transfer 
cycle persist, no m atter which world (Keynesian, Classical or New Keynesian) we live in.
5 Endogenising R ent-Seeking
The discussion of endogenised rent-seeking proceeds in three steps. First, we transform  the 
ego rent from being in office, which is costless for society, into a rent which is financed by 
society. There is a conceptual difference between an additional benefit from an ego rent and 
from rent-seeking in terms of expropriation from society, although the rent is still exogenous 
and, thus, the marginal conditions of Section 3 (and 4) remain unchanged. Under rent- 
seeking, however, the deficit is used both for paying the rent (to benefit the incumbent 
directly) as well as for financing the transfers to the public (to improve the incumbents
13
re-election chances). Second, we endogenise rent-seeking. Doing so requires assumptions 
about the maximum levels and the information dispersion of rent-seeking. Third, we can 
show on this basis th a t incumbents will always exploit society to the utm ost. Therefore, 
endogenous rent-seeking does not help reduce the deficit cycle.
As for step 1, we follow the logic of the Political Transfer Model of Section 2 as well as 
Shi and Svensson (2006): if the (still exogenous) rent X  is to be financed by society, each 
individual must contribute an equal share.
X  =  n f, (31)
where n is the number of agents in society (including the incumbent) and f  depicts the 
individual share. The government budget constraint (per capita) becomes
t t =  D t — R (D t - i ) +  nj — f . (32)
Now, the net deficit (modulo competence) is used to finance both transfers and the rent. 
The incum bent’s maximisation problem changes only slightly:
maxDt Et{yt +  Dt +  nt“ +  (n — 1)f}
+Et{[1 — F  [(1 — a)(D t — Dt)]] [yt+i — R(Dt) +  n“+i +  (n — 1)f]}
' ------------------- V------------------- '
prob. incumbent wins 
+ E ‘{ [F  [(1 — a )(D ‘ — D ‘)]] [yt+i — R (D ‘) +  n?+i — f]} (33)
[---------------------------------------v----------------- '
prob. incumbent loses
The incumbent has to pay her share of the rent, but receives the rent contributions from 
all members of society, if in power. Modifying the exogenous components of the model does 
not change the FOC or the perturbation results of Section 3 (and 4), but does affect the 
magnitude of the deficit, because it is also used for providing the incum bent’s rent.
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In step 2, consider the case of an endogenous rent. The government can now use rent-seeking 
as an additional instrum ent, but only up to a maximum level f  in each period. We know 
from our discussion of the tim ing of events beginning on page 6 th a t the incumbent will 
expropriate as much as possible in the off-election period. So we can limit our analysis to 
endogenous rent-seeking in the election period. It remains to clarify what private agents 
know about rent-seeking. To focus on the effect of endogenous rent-seeking as such we 
assume th a t informed agents can also observe the government’s rent-seeking activities, but 
uninformed agents cannot.13 As a result, the probability th a t incumbent a receives 50% of 
the votes in period t becomes
td u \  i ^  i +  D t — D t +  f t — f t ^  1 )
Prob + 2 ] +  (1 — a )[--------------20------------- + 2 ] -  2 /
=  1 — F  [(1 — a)(D t — Dt +  rt — ft)]. (34)
The maximisation problem can now be summarised as: 
m axDt,rt yt +  Dt +  ^ “-1 +  (n — 1)rt 
+yt+i — R(Dt) — f
+  [1 — F  [(1 — a)(D t — Dt +  ft — ft)]]nf 
s.t. r t <  f. (35)
In step 3, we can analyse the problem without formally deriving a solution. We can proof 
by contradiction th a t the government will always choose maximal expropriation. Let us 
start by assuming (for the moment) th a t the incumbent does actually choose the maximum
13 We could also assume that rent-seeking can be observed by, for instance, fewer people than the deficit. 
Theoretically, it would be possible to obtain an interior solution, thereby disputing the result of this paper. 
However, the share of voters who are uninformed about rent-seeking would have to be much larger than 
the share of voters who are uninformed about the deficit. Why this is so becomes obvious from the ensuing 
analysis.
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rent for election period t. In order to increase the level of transfers, would she prefer to 
reduce the rent or increase the deficit by an equal amount? Both would have the same effect 
on the critical value of density function F  and thus on the probability of receiving n f  in 
off-election period t + 1 . In addition, the utility would change by D t — R (D t) <  0 in case of 
an increase of the deficit, but decrease by (n — 1)rt , i.e. much more, in case of a reduction 
of the rent. Therefore, the government would never choose to reduce the rent when the 
deficit instrum ent is also available. This means th a t we are back at the solution discussed 
in Section 3 (and 4). Marginal conditions and perturbation results are the same, but the 
deficit must be larger because both transfers and rents must now be financed.
6 C onclusion
This paper contributes to the theoretical political budget cycle literature. We acknowledge 
the empirical findings th a t political business cycles are mainly spurred by transfers and 
deficits. Our model confirms the existence of the budget cycle: transfer and deficit cycles 
are amplified with the m agnitude of an ego rent and the share of uninformed voters. By 
endogenising output and rent-seeking we can extend this result. We find th a t political deficit 
and transfer cycles are amplified with an overall expansionary effect of deficit finance on 
output. However, the PBC always exists, no m atter what the effect, i.e. irrespective to 
which world (Keynesian, Classical or New Keynesian) we live in. We also find th a t deficit 
cycles are augmented when the government can decide on the degree of rent-seeking. The 
government will always choose the maximally possible rent. The deficit must now cover 
both  the rent (which benefits the incumbent directly) as well as the transfers to the public 
(which improve the incumbents re-election chances). Our results are not obvious, but quite 
intuitive. Nevertheless, to our knowledge, the interdependence between budget cycles and 
endogenous output or rent-seeking has not yet been studied rigorously.
Our paper suggests at least three possible extensions. First, the interdependence between
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politically motivated deficit finance and output and /or rent-seeking could be empirically 
investigated. Second, we could think about relaxing Rogoff’s (1990) fatalistic postition, 
whereby rational voters should not let their expectations about postelection performance 
be influenced by preelection behaviour. In our context, this approach implies th a t voters 
accept maximal expropriation by the incumbent, because they are only interested in the 
policymaker’s competence and its impact on future outcomes. Third, we could relax the 
assumption th a t uninformed voters form rational expectations as suggested by Shi and 
Svensson (2006) and also used in this paper. In th a t case, one has to make a behavioural 
assumption about perceived deficit as done in a similar model in Bohn (2009).
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